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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Noncompete Agreement is Not an Agreement at All
Perhaps no contractual clause invites as little respect as the
noncompete agreement. In a few states, the agreement is void and
unenforceable. In the remaining states, a noncompete agreement
scarcely rises to the level of a legally enforceable contract. The tradi-
tional elements of contract formation are not found in a noncompete
agreement. One often finds neither a bargained-for exchange nor a
meeting of the minds in these agreements. Too often, the parties to a
noncompete agreement do not believe that the agreement will be en-
forced according to its terms.
Similarly, courts give little credence to the agreement as it is actu-
ally written. Often, in those states that permit enforcement of
noncompete agreements, the language of the agreement represents a
mere starting point. In most jurisdictions, courts routinely "blue pen-
cil" or reform covenants that are not reasonable, as determined by a
multipart test. The blue pencil doctrine gives courts the authority to
either (1) strike unreasonable clauses from a noncompete agreement,
leaving the rest to be enforced, or (2) actually modify the agreement to
reflect the terms that the parties could have-and probably should
have-agreed to.
B. A Proposal to End the Blue Pencil Doctrine
This Article proposes that courts put an end to the blue pencil doc-
trine. The blue pencil doctrine violates basic contractual principles
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and has been used to alter nonconcompete agreements in two ways.
First, some courts intrude into what should be negotiated agreements
between the parties by substituting the courts' own contract terms for
those found in the agreements. Second, other courts have altered
noncompete agreements by striking "unreasonable" clauses and leav-
ing the rest of the agreement as written. Both scenarios essentially
turn courts into attorneys after the fact. Worse yet, the blue pencil
doctrine, because it creates an agreement that the parties did not ac-
tually agree to, does nothing to address the underlying problems of
noncompete agreements.
Several states already follow this "no-modification" rule. Wiscon-
sin has even mandated the no-modification approach by statute.1
Moreover, eliminating the blue pencil doctrine comports with recent
trends as courts have indicated a greater willingness to refuse to re-
form agreements that are not reasonable on their face. 2 As will be
seen herein, several recent decisions indicate that judges have grown
increasingly leery of reforming unenforceable restrictive covenants
and have been unwilling to aid employers who overreach.
With this in mind, courts everywhere should seize this opportunity
to end to the practice. It is time to put the blue pencil down.
C. An Argument for a New Test
Simply putting the blue pencil down will not end the difficulties
that courts face in the construction of noncompete agreements. There-
fore, as an alternative to the use of the blue pencil doctrine, this Arti-
cle proposes that courts should conduct a threshold test before
applying the standard reasonableness analysis. The proposed thresh-
old test would require that the agreement pass a three-part specificity
test before the court can further evaluate the contract's enforceability.
The idea is that every noncompete agreement should maintain a cer-
tain minimum level of specificity. This specificity requirement, as out-
lined below, may be instituted either legislatively or introduced via
common law. The specificity requirement should mandate that the
contract identify the following: (1) the employment position subject to
the restriction; (2) the legitimate business interests that the restric-
tion will protect; and (3) the means by which the proposed restriction
will protect those interests. This imposes only a minimal extra bur-
den on employers while providing courts with the tools necessary to
construe the agreements.
1. WIs. STAT. § 103.465 (2002). According to the statute, "Any covenant [not to com-
pete], described in this subsection, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal,
void and unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or performance that
would be a reasonable restraint."
2. See infra section IV.A.
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Refusing to blue-pencil documents and implementing the specific-
ity requirement brings a number of advantages. First, courts are no
longer faced with the obligation to make new contracts between the
parties. Second, an employee is able to know exactly what restrictions
will bind him if he chooses to leave his job. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, an employer is required to consider the terms and condi-
tions of its employees' contracts carefully, value those employees ac-
cordingly, and draft the agreement's language carefully.
D. An Article Overview
Part II of this Article will provide an overview of the noncompete
agreement, as well as describe the difficulties faced by litigants and
courts alike in the enforcement of noncompete agreements. Part III
examines the use of the blue pencil doctrine, its development, and the
differences between liberal and strict use. Part IV outlines the speci-
ficity requirement and its accompanying three-part analysis. Part V
concludes by establishing that the specificity requirement will simul-
taneously benefit employers, employees, and the judicial system.
II. THE NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT EXPLAINED BRIEFLY
It is no doubt apparent to the reader at this point that we have not cleared up
the swampy morass of conflicting interests and policies into which a court may
eventually need to plunge to resolve the problems these covenants present.3
A. The "Swampy Morass"
Generally, a noncompete agreement is "[a]n agreement, generally
part of a contract of employment or a contract to sell a business, in
which the covenantor agrees for a specific period of time and within a
particular area to refrain from competition with the covenantee." 4
The noncompete agreement is known by other names, most notably as
a "covenant not to compete," a "restrictive covenant," or a "non-com-
pete clause." The terms are freely interchangeable, and refer to an
employment contract provision purporting to limit an employee's
power, upon leaving his employment, to compete in the market in
which his former employer does business.5 But, since no substantive
difference exists among the names, this Article will refer to such cove-
nants as "noncompete agreements."
The noncompete agreement is a form of restrictive covenant that
adds limitations to an employment contract. Generally, employers
pursue these agreements in two instances: when hiring a new em-
ployee or when purchasing an established business. Typically, these
3. Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 917 (W. Va. 1982).
4. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 364 (6th ed. 1990).
5. Reddy, 298 S.E.2d at 916.
2008]
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agreements restrict former employees from performing similar work
within a certain geographic area for a competitor during a specific pe-
riod of time.
This Article primarily addresses noncompete agreements in a post-
employment context. 6 Noncompete agreements executed in conjunc-
tion with employment generally are designed to prohibit an employee
from competing with his employer after the termination of the employ-
ment agreement. 7 Courts will scrutinize restrictions on the behavior
of former employees closely, while they will review agreements re-
stricting the sellers of businesses at a lower level of scrutiny.8 In the
employment context, noncompete agreements generally span four dif-
ferent areas: (1) general non-competition; (2) customer (or client) non-
solicitation; (3) employee non-solicitation; and (4) non-disclosure. 9
Nevertheless, these four different areas are regularly intermingled.
Noncompete agreements may, and often do, contain some or all of
these protective clauses.
Theoretically, noncompete agreements are not meant to punish the
former employee.1O Instead, they are meant to protect the employer
from unfair competition."' Noncompete agreements arguably protect
an employer's customer base, trade secrets, and other information
necessary to its success. One might argue that a noncompete agree-
ment encourages employers to invest in their employees. An employer
does not wish to invest in an employee only to see the employee take
the skills acquired, or the company's customers, with him to another
employer. The employer will invest more in the employee if a means
exists to guard against the employee's movement to a competitor. As
a result, today's employment agreements typically include noncom-
pete agreements. There is little doubt that most employers favor such
agreements. Moreover, noncompete agreements are almost invariably
drafted in favor of the employer.12 Notably, an agreement need not be
specifically styled as a noncompete agreement to be construed as one.
Any agreement that has "the potential . . . to act as a restraint on
6. Noncompete agreements are often included in contracts executed in conjunction
with the sale of a business.
7. Ronald B. Coolley, Definitions, Duties, Covenants Not to Compete, Assignment Af-
ter Termination and Severability, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 20, 24 (1986).
8. See, e.g., Watson v. Waffle House, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Ga. 1985); Richard-
son v. Paxton Co., 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (Va. 1962).
9. Kenneth J. Vanko, "You're Fired! And Don't Forget Your Non-compete . The
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DEPAUL
Bus. & COM. L.J. 1, 2 (2002).
10. See Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards, 869 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
11. William M. Corrigan & Michael B. Kass, Non-Compete Agreements And Unfair
Competition-An Updated Overview, 62 J. Mo. B. 81, 81 (2006).
12. Vanko, supra note 9, at 1.
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trade . . . 'should be subject to the same standards of reasonableness
as covenants not to compete." ' 13
As noncompete agreements constitute at least a partial restraint
on trade, the legal system constantly struggles to balance such re-
straints against the countervailing forces of a free market economy.
In response to this tension, some states, notably California, Montana,
and Oklahoma, prohibit employers from enforcing noncompete agree-
ments as a matter of public policy, or severely limit the noncompete
agreements employers may enforce. 14
California's refusal to enforce noncompete agreements has received
a great deal of academic attention in light of its overall economic
health.15 The purpose of the state statute that prohibits noncompete
agreements is plain: "Except as provided in this chapter, every con-
tract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profes-
sion, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void."1 6
B. Enforcement of the Noncompete Agreement
1. The Reasonableness Test
Among the remaining states, noncompete agreements are enforce-
able only to the extent that they are "reasonably necessary to protect
narrowly defined and well-recognized employer interests."17 Thus, al-
most all courts apply a standard of reasonableness in deciding
whether to enforce a noncompete agreement. As will be seen below,
however, "reasonableness" as a standard holds minimal value in the
construction of noncompete agreements.' 8
13. Hardy v. Mann Frankfort, No. 01-05-01080-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 3442, at
*12 (Tex. App. May 3, 2007) (citing Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818
S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tex. 1991)). In Peat Marwick, the plaintiff sought to enforce a
contractual provision that required its former employee to pay a certain amount
to his former employer whenever he provided accounting services to the em-
ployer's previous clients. Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d. at 383. Although the provi-
sion was not styled as a noncompete agreement, the court concluded "that
provisions clearly intended to restrict the right to render personal services are in
restraint of trade and must be analyzed for the same standards of reasonableness
as covenants not to compete to be enforceable." Id. at 388.
14. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit 15, §§ 217, 219A
(Cum. Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2005).
15. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology In-
dustrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
16. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 2007).
17. See Washington County Mem'l Hosp. v. Sidebottom, 7 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999) (citing Easy Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz, 964 S.W.2d 450, 453
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).
18. The court in Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1982),
put it best:
Reasonableness, in the context of restrictive covenants, is a term of art,
although it is not a term lending itself to crisp, exact definition. Reason-
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Although nineteen states provide a statutory framework for the
regulation of noncompete agreements, the rest do not, and have cho-
sen instead to rely on the court system. 19 In common law jurisdic-
tions, a noncompete agreement will be upheld only "if the restraint
imposed is not unreasonable, is founded on a valuable consideration,
and is reasonably necessary to protect the interest of the party in
whose favor it is imposed, and does not unduly prejudice the interests
of the public." 20 Courts will enforce such covenants only where they
are "strictly limited in time and territorial effect and . . . [are] other-
wise reasonable considering the business interest of the employer
sought to be protected and the effect on the employee." 2 1 In common
law jurisdictions, agreements are enforced if they are found to be rea-
sonable considering three factors:
First .... [the agreement] must be ancillary to an otherwise valid contract,
transaction or relationship. Second, the restraint created must not be greater
than necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate interests such as business,
goodwill, trade secrets, or other confidential or proprietary information.
Third, the promisee's need for the protection given by the agreement must not
be outweighed by either the hardship to the promissor or any injury likely to
the public.2 2
Many states follow the test set forth in the Restatement, which takes
into consideration the following factors that are quite similar: (1)
whether the restriction is greater than necessary to protect the busi-
ness and goodwill of the employer; (2) whether the employer's need for
protection outweighs the economic hardship which the covenant im-
poses on the departing party; and (3) whether the restriction ad-
versely affects the interests of the public.23
ableness, as a juridical term, is generally used to define the limits of
acceptability and thus concerns the perimeter and not the structure of
the area it is used to describe. This general observation is nowhere more
particularly true than with respect to a restrictive covenant. Once a con-
tract falls within the rule of reason, the rule operates only as a conclu-
sive observation and provides no further guidance. A court's
manipulation of the terms of an anticompetitive covenant, where none of
its provisions standing alone is an inherently unreasonable one, cannot
be accomplished with reasonableness as the standard. It is like being in
the jungle-you're either in or you're out, and once you're in the distinc-
tion is worthless for establishing your exact location.
Id. at 911.
19. Vanko, supra note 9, at 2.
20. W.R. Grace & Co., Dearborn Div. v. Mouyal, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (Ga. 1992) (quot-
ing Rakestraw v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 738 (Ga. 1898)).
21. Palmer & Cay, Inc., v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 404 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir.
2005).
22. Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Tex. 1991). In Texas,
the common law test was later codified in the Texas Business and Commerce
Code.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. a (1979).
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With regard to the first of these factors, courts examine noncom-
pete agreements to make sure they are limited because such agree-
ments limit the exercise or pursuit of an individual's occupation.
Thus, to be enforceable, agreements must be reasonable in three ways:
scope (referring to the subject matter of the agreement), duration, and
geography. 24
2. Limitations on Scope of Activity
There are two general types of "scope of activity" limitations: those
that prohibit the employee from soliciting the employer's customers
and those that prohibit the employee from engaging in any competi-
tive business. With respect to customer solicitation, "reasonable" limi-
tations are valid and enforceable. 2 5 A legitimate purpose of a
noncompete agreement is to prevent "employees or departing partners
from using the business contacts and rapport established during the
relationship of representing . . . [a] firm to take the firm's customers
with him."2 6 Thus, noncompete agreements that are limited to those
customers with whom the employee had daily contact on a personal
level would likely be deemed reasonable.
24. See UARCO Inc. v. Lam, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D. Haw. 1998) (noting pa-
rameters of reasonableness inquiry); Pinnacle Performance, Inc. v. Hessing, 17
P.3d 308, 311 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (same).
25. See Ruscitto v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1349,
1354 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (limiting the solicitation of "any of the clients of Merrill
Lynch whom [the employee] served or whose names became known to [the em-
ployee] while in the employ of Merrill Lynch" was reasonable), affd, 948 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930 (1992); Picker Int'l v. Blanton, 756
F. Supp. 971, 982 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that the limitation against servicing
MRI systems that employee serviced while with employer was reasonable); Inves-
tors Diversified Servs., Inc. v. McElroy, 645 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. App. 1982)
(holding that the limitation against soliciting customers with whom the employee
dealt or had contact during employment was reasonable).
26. Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 387. Some customer solicitation limitations may be
considered overbroad, unreasonable, and, therefore, unenforceable, at least with-
out reformation. In Peat Marwick, the Texas Supreme Court held that a cove-
nant not to compete was overbroad and unenforceable. Id. at 388. The covenant
prohibited a former partner of an accounting firm from soliciting or doing busi-
ness for clients acquired by the firm after the partner left, or with whom the
partner had no contact while at the firm. For a scope of activity limitation of this
type to be reasonable, there must be "a connection between the personal involve-
ment of the former firm member [and] the client." Id. at 387. Therefore, a cove-
nant against soliciting customers should be limited to customers with whom the
employee had contact during the period of employment; absent such a limitation,
the covenant is overbroad.
The second, and broader, scope of activity limitation is one that prohibits any
competitive activity. Texas courts generally uphold such limitations when the
employer is engaged in only a single type of business. On the other hand, when
an employer engages in a number of different types of business, such a limitation
may be unreasonable unless it is limited to the specific type of business in which
the employee worked while employed by the employer.
20081
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3. Limitations on Time
The duration of the restriction also determines the reasonableness
of the restraint. Restraints that are unlimited in time are almost al-
ways unreasonable. 2 7 However, it is necessary to consider the partic-
ular industry at issue to determine whether the particular restraint is
reasonable as to time. The courts' inconsistent analysis under this
fact-specific nature of this inquiry has led to frustration. As one com-
mentator states:
A look at the cases finds courts upholding restrictive covenants that last as
long as five or ten years, while invalidating others that last only one or two
years. Moreover, courts in the same jurisdiction will uphold a three-year limi-
tation in one case but invalidate it in another. Unfortunately, in so doing the
courts seldom attempt to reconcile their decisions, except perhaps by saying
that each case must be decided on its own facts. In reviewing the cases, one
could decide that the decisions are totally serendipitous and would not be far
wrong. However, luck and good fortune are not particularly helpful when
drafting clauses. 2 8
A review of case law indicates that most courts usually uphold time
limitations of one or two years. While limitations of three to five years
may be upheld in the sale of a business, the decisions conflict as to
whether a three to five year limitation is reasonable in an employment
situation.2 9
4. Limitations on Geography
The geographical limitation in a noncompete agreement must be
definite. An indefinite description of the geographical area should
render the agreement unenforceable as written. 30 Numerous courts
have found that a reasonable area consists of the territory in which
the employee worked while employed. 3 1 Beyond this general rule,
27. See, e.g., Taylor v. Saurman, 1 A. 40, 41 (Pa. 1885) (declaring covenant not to
engage in photography again void as against public policy).
28. 1 KURT H. DECKER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 127 (2d ed. 1993).
29. Texas cases provide a representative array of decisions. See generally Property
Tax Assocs., Inc. v. Staffeldt, 800 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Tex. App. 1990) ("The courts
of this state have upheld restrictions ranging from two to five years as reasona-
ble."); Investors Diversified Servs., Inc. v. McElroy, 645 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex.
App. 1982) ("[T]wo to five years have repeatedly been held to be reasonable.");
Bob Pagan Ford, Inc. v. Smith, 638 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. App. 1982 ) (upholding trial
court's decision to reform the restricted period under an employment agreement
from three years to six months).
30. See generally Butts Retail, Inc. v. Diversifoods, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex.
App. 1992) (holding the language "'metropolitan area' of the Parkdale Mall store
in Beaumont, Texas" indefinite and unenforceable); Gomez v. Zamora, 814
S.W.2d 114, 117-18 (Tex. App. 1991) (holding the language "existing marketing
area" and "future marketing area of the employer begun during employment" in-
definite and unenforceable).
31. Once again, we can look to Texas decisions for a representative example. See e.g.,
Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 660 (Tex. App. 1992); Diversified
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however, what constitutes a reasonable geographical area invariably
depends upon the facts of the specific case.
Traditionally, the reasonableness of a geographic limitation was
directly related to the location of the territory in which the employee
worked for his former employer. 32 Courts have found that geographic
restraints were reasonable "if the area of the restraint is no broader
than the territory throughout which the employee was able to estab-
lish contact with his employer's customers during the term of his
employment." 33
III. THE BLUE PENCIL DOCTRINE IN ENFORCEMENT OF
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS
A. The Blue Pencil Doctrine Defined
The "blue-pencil test" is a "judicial standard for deciding whether
to invalidate the whole contract or only the offending words." 34 If the
blue pencil doctrine is strictly applied, "only the offending words are
invalidated if it would be possible to delete them simply by running a
blue pencil through them, as opposed to changing, adding, or rear-
ranging words."35
The blue pencil doctrine is based in large part on the "understand-
ing that there is not necessarily a sinister purpose behind an over-
broad restrictive covenant."3 6 Courts can and do look to the good faith
of the employer in determining whether to utilize the blue pencil
doctrine. 3 7
Human Res. Group, Inc. v. Levinson-Polakoff, 752 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tex. App. 1988);
Martin v. Linen Sys. for Hosps., Inc., 671 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. App. 1984); Cross
v. Chem-Air S., Inc., 648 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. App. 1983).
32. See Diversified Human Res. Group, Inc. v. Levinson-Polakoff, 752 S.W.2d 8, 12
(Tex. App. 1988); Butler v. Arrow Mirror & Glass, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 787, 793 (Tex.
App. 2001).
33. Todd M. Foss, Texas, Covenants Not to Compete, and the Twenty-First Century:
Can the Pieces Fit Together in a Dot.Com Business World, 3 Hous. Bus. & TAX
L.J. 207, 225 (2003) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Curtis v. Ziff Energy Group,
Ltd., 12 S.W.3d 114, 119 (Tex. App. 2000); Evan's World Travel, Inc. v. Adams,
978 S.W.2d 225, 232-33 (Tex. App. 1998).
34. BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 183 (8th ed. 2004).
35. Id.
36. Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 914 (W. Va. 1982) ("[I]n
most cases, the promise is not required by the employer because he is a hard-
hearted oppressor of the poor. He too is engaged in the struggle for prosperity
and must bend every effort to gain and to retain the good will of his customers. It
is the function of the law to maintain a reasonable balance .... (quoting A.L.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1394 at 89 (1962)).
37. See id. at 916. ("If the reviewing court is satisfied that the covenant is reasonable
on its face, hence within the perimeter of the rule of reason, it may then proceed
with analysis leading to a 'rule of best result.' Pursuant to that analysis, the court




B. Three Approaches to the Blue Pencil Doctrine
Use of the blue pencil doctrine differs from state to state. Among
those states that enforce noncompete agreements, three schools of
thought exist. The First Circuit has stated:
Courts presented with restrictive covenants containing unenforceable provi-
sions have taken three approaches: (1) the "all or nothing" approach, which
would void the restrictive covenant entirely if any part is unenforceable, (2)
the "blue pencil" approach, which enables the court to enforce the reasonable
terms provided the covenant remains grammatically coherent once its unrea-
sonable provisions are excised, and (3) the "partial enforcement" approach,
which reforms and enforces the restrictive covenant to the extent it is reasona-
ble, unless the "circumstances indicate bad faith or deliberate overreaching"
on the part of the employer.3 8
As noted above, some states follow a "no modification" approach to
noncompete agreements. Also known as the "all-or-nothing" rule, it
precludes the use of the blue pencil doctrine. Courts must refrain
from either rewriting or striking overbroad provisions in noncompete
agreements. Courts in no-modification states first determine whether
the restrictive covenant is reasonable as written. If not, the court will
not modify or eliminate provisions, but will instead refuse to enforce
the agreement at all.
The second approach is known as the strict blue-pencil rule. The
strict blue-pencil rule does not allow courts to rewrite overbroad
noncompete agreements. Instead, the strict approach allows courts
only to strike overbroad provisions and enforce what is left of the
agreement. Enforcement is permitted only if the agreement is reason-
ably limited after the overbroad provisions have been removed.
Finally, other states have adopted a liberal form of blue pencil doc-
trine: the "reasonable modification" approach. These states permit a
court to rewrite an overbroad non-competition agreement to reasona-
bly limit the restrictions found in the agreement.
1. The No-Modification States
It is the position of this Article that the no-modification rule, as
exemplified by the Wisconsin statute described herein, should be
adopted either legislatively or as a common law standard in those
states that enforce noncompete agreements.
The blue pencil doctrine, although used in a majority of states, is
not universal. Certain states, notably Georgia, Virginia, and Wiscon-
sin, follow the "no-modification" rule.3 9 This rule recognizes the ineq-
38. Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1469
(1st Cir. 1992) (citing Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods. Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1058 (R.I.
1989)).
39. Nebraska courts have not applied the blue pencil doctrine, but one cannot count
it among the no-modification states, as the Nebraska Supreme Court has re-
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uities inherent in a rule that imposes an agreement on the parties
that was not part of the original bargained-for agreement.
Georgia's use of the no-modification approach is a representative
example. Noncompete agreements in Georgia may not be blue-pen-
ciled to sever or modify any overreaching provisions. 40 Thus, "if any
[restrictive] covenant . . . within a given employment contract is un-
reasonable either in time, territory, or prohibited business activity,
then all covenants not to compete within the same employment con-
tract are unenforceable."41
Similarly, courts in Virginia evaluate the noncompete agreement
as written without revising or eliminating provisions. Virginia courts
lack the authority to "'blue pencil' or otherwise rewrite the contract"
to eliminate any illegal overbreadth. 4 2 Ambiguous language suscepti-
ble to two or more differing interpretations, one of which is function-
ally overbroad, renders the entire noncompete agreement
unenforceable. This remains true even though it may be reasonable in
the context of the factors present.4 3
Wisconsin has codified its "no blue pencil rule" in § 103.465 of the
Wisconsin Statutes. According to the statute, "[aIny covenant [not to
compete] . . . imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and
unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or performance that
would be a reasonable restraint."4 4
2. The Strict Blue Pencil Doctrine
The strict blue pencil doctrine permits only the removal of unrea-
sonable contractual provisions. The court is not permitted to revise or
add language to the agreement. The strict blue pencil doctrine at-
tempts to restrict employer overreaching by removing the offending
provisions and leaving an otherwise enforceable agreement. 4 5
Indiana provides an example of a jurisdiction that uses the strict
blue pencil doctrine. When reviewing covenants not to compete, Indi-
ana courts have historically enforced reasonable restrictions, but have
struck unreasonable restrictions, provided the restrictions are divisi-
served the right to use the doctrine. Polly v. Ray D. Hilderman & Co., 225 Neb.
662, 669, 407 N.W.2d 751, 756-57 (1987).
40. Allied Informatics, Inc. v. Yeruva, 554 S.E.2d 550, 553 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)
41. Ward v. Process Control Corp., 277 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1981).
42. See Pais v. Automation Products, Inc., 36 Va. Cir. 230, 239 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1995).
43. Lanmark Tech. Inc. v. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 2006)
44. WIs. STAT. § 103.465 (2007).
45. Deustche Post Global Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad, 292 F.Supp 2d 748, 754 (D. Md. 2003)
(The strict approach is "limited to removing the offending language without sup-
plementing or rearranging the remaining language.").
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ble.46 Although the practice is long-standing, Indiana courts did not
use the label "blue pencil doctrine" until 1982.47
Under Indiana law, "when an employer drafts an overly broad cov-
enant, the price of over-reaching is that the restriction cannot be en-
forced at all, even if it would have been possible to draft and enforce a
narrower, more reasonable restriction."48 Even in those cases where
the equities of the situation might suggest enforcement, courts have
no alternative but to reject the overly broad clause rather than modifyit.49
If, however, the noncompete agreement is clearly separated into
parts, and if some parts are reasonable and others are not, the offend-
ing clauses may be severed so that the reasonable portions may be
enforced.5O The court is constrained in that it may apply only the
terms within the contract and cannot add terms.5 1
Similarly, in Arizona, although courts will not add terms or rewrite
provisions to covenants, 52 they will blue pencil restrictive covenants,
"eliminating grammatically severable, unreasonable provisions."53 In
the case of severable clauses, an Arizona court can enforce the lawful
part and ignore the unlawful part.5 4 Even though courts are permit-
ted to prune contracts, they cannot rewrite them for the parties.55
The strict blue pencil doctrine will not save those documents that
would require the court to rewrite the durational requirement or add
geographic limitations.56 In short, the strict blue pencil doctrine in
Arizona permits courts to consider separate clauses separately, but
without severable language to excise to render an agreement reasona-
ble, the court is without power to enforce the agreement.
Notably, in strict blue pencil states, if the agreement fails to meet
the standard of reasonableness in any of the three areas-scope, dura-
46. Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66, 69 (1884); Beard v. Dennis, 6 Ind. 200, 203-05
(1855); Bennett v. Carmichael Produce Co., 115 N.E. 793, 795-96 (Ind. App.
1917).
47. See Seach v. Richards, Dieterle & Co., 439 N.E.2d 208, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
48. Dearborn v. Everett J. Prescott, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
See also Young v. Van Zandt, 449 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ind. App. 1983) ("If the cove-
nant is not reasonable as written, the court may not create a reasonable restric-
tion under the guise of interpretation, since this would subject the parties to an
agreement they had not made.").
49. Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235, 241 (Ind. 1955).
50. Licocci v. Cardinal Associates, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 1983) ("[Ilf the cov-
enant is clearly separated into parts and some parts are reasonable and others
are not, the contract may be held divisible.").
51. Id.
52. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999).
53. Id.
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tion, or geography-the court will find the entire agreement unen-
forceable. For instance, in Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber,5 7 the
Arizona Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of a non-compete
clause prohibiting a departing physician from practicing medicine
within a five-mile radius of any of three specific clinic locations for a
period of three years.58 The contract also had a reformation clause
that allowed a court, if necessary, to amend the non-compete provision
to make it enforceable. 59 Despite the reformation clause, the Court
held that the non-compete was unenforceable because both the scope
of the activity prohibited and duration were unreasonable. 60 Thus,
the reformation clause did not permit the appellate court to rewrite
the non-compete provision "in an attempt to make it enforceable."61
The Court explained, under Arizona law, courts may blue-pencil a cov-
enant by "eliminating grammatically severable, unreasonable provi-
sions," but they are prohibited from adding or rewriting provisions.6 2
Some courts in strict blue pencil states have indicated that they
prefer not to narrow the scope of a clause because the parties did not
agree to new terms.6 3 The strict blue pencil rule holds that a court
may not, under the guise of interpretation, redraft a noncompete
agreement to make it more reasonable or narrower.6 4
One state court recently described what it believed was the proper
use of the strict blue pencil doctrine. The court explained that under
such an approach, "[tihe 'blue pencil' marks, but does not write."6 5
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that in a strict blue pencil juris-
diction, courts "cannot rewrite . . . restrictive covenants, inserting
clauses and providing sufficient limitations so as to render the restric-
tions reasonable and enforceable.... "66
West Virginia follows a similar approach regarding the enforce-
ment of noncompete agreements. 6 7 These courts follow a "rule of rea-
son" that determines the enforceability of any noncompetition
57. 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999).
58. Id. at 1279.
59. Id. at 1285 n.2.
60. Id. at 1284-85.
61. Id. at 1286.
62. Id.
63. See Dicen v. New Sesco, Inc., 839 N.E.2d 684, 689 (Ind. 2005); Burk v. Heritage
Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803, 811-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
64. See Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 1983).
65. New Atlanta Ear, Nose & Throat Assocs., P.C. v. Pratt, 560 S.E.2d 268, 273 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Hamrick v. Kelley, 392 S.E.2d 518, 519 (Ga. 1990)). See
Watson v. Waffle House, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Ga. 1985); Richard P. Rita
Pers. Services Int'l, Inc. v. Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 80 (Ga. 1972).
66. Donovan v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 181 F. App'x 782, 783 (11th Cir. 2006); New At-
lanta, 560 S.E.2d at 273.
67. Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 73 S.E.2d 438, 440-43 (W. Va. 1952).
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covenant.68 Under this rule, the courts should approach restrictive
covenants with "grave reservations." 69 In West Virginia, therefore, a
covenant that is unreasonable on its face is utterly void and unen-
forceable. 70 For instance, an excessively broad covenant with respect
to time or geographic scope is unreasonable on its face. 71
The West Virginia Supreme Court attempted to distinguish the
difference between a threshold reasonableness analysis and a subse-
quent approach. In determining whether a covenant is unreasonable
on its face, the court must keep in mind that it is a threshold question:
Our courts should approach the available authority with respect to time and
area limitations with caution. Most other courts fail to use the distinction we
have adopted between a threshold inquiry as to the reasonableness of the cov-
enant and a "rule of best result" within the general ambit of the rule of reason.
Those courts use rule of reason language well past the threshold inquiry, and
their standard of reasonableness for purposes of shaving the covenant to rea-
sonable proportions should not be confused with a standard of "reasonable-
ness on its face" for the purpose of deciding whether the covenant merits
further scrutiny. 7 2
Courts use the strict blue pencil rule to strike an unreasonable restric-
tion "to the extent that a grammatically meaningful reasonable re-
striction remains after the words making the restriction unreasonable
are stricken."7 3
In North Carolina, an unreasonably broad provision also renders
the entire covenant unenforceable. Under North Carolina law, "equity
will neither enforce nor reform an overreaching and unreasonable cov-
68. Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 915 (W. Va. 1982).
69. Id.
70. See id. ("No court should trouble itself to rewrite an inherently unreasonable cov-
enant to bring the covenant within the rule of reason.").
71. Id.
72. Id. at 915, n.7.
73. A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. Strough, 103 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1996). In Beit v. Beit,
63 A.2d 161 (Conn. 1948), the Court stated:
There is undoubtedly a strong tendency on the part of courts to regard as
divisible restraints of trade which are unreasonable in the extent of area
covered and to hold them invalid only so far as necessary for the protec-
tion of the covenantee, where the terms of the promise permit that to be
done without clearly violating the intent of the parties .... A restrictive
covenant which contains or may be read as containing distinct undertak-
ings bounded by different limits of space or time, or different in subject
matter, may be good as to part and bad as to part. But this does not
mean that a single covenant may be artificially split up in order to pick
out some part of it that it can be upheld. Severance is permissible only
in the case of a covenant which is in effect a combination of several dis-
tinct covenants. Where the covenant is intended by the parties to be an
entirety, it cannot properly be so divided by a court that it will be held
good for a certain area but invalid for another; indeed ... this would be
to make an agreement for the parties into which they did not voluntarily
enter.
Id. at 204-05 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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enant."74 More specifically, while North Carolina's blue pencil rule
severely limits what the court may do to alter an unenforceable cove-
nant, a court "may choose not to enforce a distinctly severable part of a
covenant in order to render the provision reasonable." 75
3. The Liberal Blue Pencil Doctrine
The liberal blue pencil doctrine permits a court greater leeway to
change an agreement substantively. Courts may use the blue pencil
doctrine to modify an unreasonable noncompete agreement and en-
force the agreement only to the extent that it is reasonable. 7 6 A court
may thus use the liberal blue pencil approach to modify the covenant
so that it is no broader than what is reasonably necessary to protect
the employer. 7 7
In Minnesota, a liberal blue pencil state, courts face few limits on
their equitable powers. In the case of Klick v. Crosstown State Bank of
Ham Lake, Inc.,78 for instance, the court stated that it had the power
and discretion to modify an employment contract or not, depending
upon equitable considerations and the particular facts of the case. 79
Illinois also follows the liberal blue pencil rule, allowing courts "to
modify . . . unreasonable terms of an agreement in order to make it
reasonable."8 0
New Jersey is another example of a jurisdiction that applies the
blue pencil rule liberally. There, when restrictive covenants are found
to violate the reasonableness test, rather than deem the covenant void
ab initio, courts will enforce them to the extent that is reasonable
under the circumstances.8 1 This principle of partial enforcement does
not depend upon mechanical divisibility of a contract clause, but
rather asks whether or not "partial enforcement is possible without
injury to the public and without injustice to the parties."8 2
Likewise, Pennsylvania courts also view the blue pencil doctrine
liberally. Even when confronted with a "limitless" restriction that
would render a noncompete clause inherently unreasonable, a court
74. Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 912, 917 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)
(quoting Beasley v. Banks, 90 368 S.E.2d 885, 886 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)).
75. Id. at 920.
76. Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1977).
77. Id.
78. 372 N.W.2d 85 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
79. Id. at 88-89.
80. Joy v. Hay Group, Inc., No. 02C4989, 2003 WL 22118930, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
11, 2003).
81. See Hudson Foam Latex Prods., Inc. v. Aiken, 198 A.2d 136, 140 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1964) (citing Chas. S. Wood & Co. v. Kane, 125 A.2d 872 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1956)).
82. Solari Indus. Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 57 (N.J. 1970).
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may still save the agreement.8 3 Under Pennsylvania law, a court sit-
ting in equity may grant enforcement of an overbroad covenant and, to
cure the overbreadth, has the power to craft a restriction to make it
reasonable and enforceable. 84
Massachusetts and New Hampshire also follow the liberal blue
pencil doctrine. In Massachusetts, "courts will not invalidate an un-
reasonable noncompete covenant completely but will enforce it to the
extent that it is reasonable."8 5 In New Hampshire, "[e]ven if the trial
court determines that the covenant is unreasonable, the employer
nonetheless may be entitled to equitable relief in the form of reforma-
tion or partial enforcement of an overly broad covenant upon a show-
ing of his exercise of good faith in the execution of the employment
contract."86
Maine follows the most unusual method of applying the liberal
blue pencil doctrine. In Maine, the Court completely disregards the
agreement as drafted and agreed to by the parties.8 7 Instead, the
court considers the scope of the covenant only as the employer seeks to
enforce it.88 In essence, the alleged bargained-for exchange between
the parties lacks all meaning. This unique interpretation of the blue
pencil doctrine was developed in Chapman & Drake v. Harrington,8 9
in which the Court wrote the following: "Since the reasonableness of
the noncompetition agreement depends upon the specific facts of the
case.., we assess that agreement only as... [the plaintiff] has sought
to apply it and not as it might have been enforced on its plain
terms."90
C. Step-Down Provisions
Employers now frequently include step-down provisions within
their noncompete agreements. These provisions generally provide al-
ternative restrictions within the contract itself. By permitting a court
confronted with an unreasonable restriction to choose the alternative
that is reasonable, the step-down provision essentially writes the lib-
eral blue pencil rule into the contract. Logic dictates that enforcement
83. Hillard v. Medtronic. Inc., 910 F. Supp. 173, 177 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
84. Id.; Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 351 A.2d 250, 254 (Wash. 1968).
85. L.G. Balfour Co. v. McGinnis, 759 F. Supp. 840, 845 (D.D.C. 1991).
86. Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406 A.2d 1310, 1311 (N.H. 1979).
87. See Brignull v. Albert, 666 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1995).
88. Everett J. Prescott, Inc. v. Ross, 383 F. Supp. 2d 180, 190 (D. Me. 2005); Brignull,
666 A.2d at 84.
89. 545 A.2d 645 (Me. 1988).
90. Id. at 647 (citing Am. Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Vodra, 222 Neb. 480, 488, 385 N.W.2d 73,
79 (1986)).
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of the step-down provision ensures an eventual employer victory.
Such provisions "seek[] to make the 'possible' inevitable."9 1
It remains an open question as to whether courts in blue pencil
states will enforce step-down provisions.9 2 An Arizona court has,
however, found that "carefully crafted.., step-down provisions are a
permissible application of Arizona's blue-pencil rule."9 3 In Compass
Bank v. Hartley,94 the court found that such provisions were enforcea-
ble where the court could "cross-out some unreasonable sections in
favor of more reasonable ones without rewriting them."9 5
The Compass Bank court explained that agreements providing dif-
ferent options, some of which may be reasonable, gave the employer
and employee the chance to consider possible alternatives prior to exe-
cution of the agreement. 9 6 As such, the parties had the ability to ex-
amine and consider the range of alternative terms in the contract
before ever signing it.97 If a court eliminated an unreasonable term,
the elimination of the term would constitute an insignificant change
because the parties had already considered such a modification in the
execution of the contract. 98 The court concluded by noting that a dif-
ferent result would occur in those situations where the alternatives
are "indefinite and inconsistent with the underlying provision, and are
not easily severable from unreasonable provisions."99 In such cases,
the agreement would be void as there would have been "no meeting of
the minds."10 0
As will be seen in greater detail below, courts in other states disa-
gree with this conclusion.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE USE OF THE BLUE
PENCIL DOCTRINE
A. The Blue Pencil Doctrine Harms Employees
The blue pencil places too heavy of a burden on employees. The
blue pencil doctrine permits employers to overreach, and in so doing,
harms employees. In many jurisdictions, employers may safely exe-
91. Ali J. Farhang & Ray K. Harris, Non-Compete Agreements With Step-Down Provi-
sions, ARiz. Arr'Y, Dec. 2005, at 32 n.11.
92. Ray K. Harris & Ali J. Farhang, Non-Compete Agreements with Step-Down Provi-
sions: Will Courts in "Blue-Pencil" States Enforce Them?, COMPUTER & INTERNET
L., Jul. 2006, at 1, 1.
93. Compass Bank v. Hartley, 430 F. Supp. 2d 973, 981 (D. Ariz. 2006).
94. Id.








cute contracts that contain unenforceable agreements. The employer
then receives what amounts to a free ride on a contractual provision
that the employer is well aware would never be enforced. In the words
of one commentator, "[t]his smacks of having one's employee's cake,
and eating it too."1o1
The problem is commonly referred to as the in terrorem effect.
Blue-penciling of the contract permits an "in terrorem effect on an em-
ployee, who must try to interpret the ambiguous provision to decide
whether it is prudent, from a standpoint of possible legal liability, to
accept a particular job or whether it might be necessary to resist
plaintiffs efforts to assert that the provision covers a particular
job."102 It is true that an employer may try to limit the in terrorem
effect of an ambiguous non-compete clause by interpreting it nar-
rowly, but such a "request for limited relief cannot cure what is other-
wise a defective non-competition agreement."10 3
Numerous courts have noted the possible harmful effect of the
overly broad covenant. In the case of Reddy v. Community Health
Foundation of Man, 10 4 the Court decried the use of overly broad provi-
sions, "where savage covenants are included in employment contracts
so that their overbreadth operates, by in terrorem effect, to subjugate
employees unaware of the tentative nature of such a covenant."105
Likewise, in Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber,10 6 the Court noted
that "[] or every agreement that makes its way to court, many more do
not.
Perhaps the Court in Rita Personnel Services107 best captured the
essence of the problem:
For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands which
exercise an in terrorem effect on employees who respect their contractual obli-
gations and on competitors who fear legal complications if they employ a cove-
nantor, or who are anxious to maintain gentlemanly relations with their
competitors. Thus, the mobility of untold numbers of employees is restricted
by the intimidation of restrictions whose severity no court would sanction. 
1 0 8
By providing an eventual remedy of sorts, the blue pencil doctrine
increases the use of overly broad clauses. In those states employing
the doctrine, employers are effectively encouraged to enter into other-
101. Richard P. Rita Pers. Services Int'l, Inc. v. Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga.1972) (cit-
ing Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV.
625, 682-83 (1960)).
102. Lanmark Tech. Inc. v. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 2006) (quoting
Pais v. Automation Prods. 36 Va. Cir. 230, 239 (1995)).
103. Cliff Simmons Roofing, Inc., v. Cash, 49 Va. Cir. 156, 158 (1999).
104. 298 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1982)
105. Id. at 916.
106. 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999).
107. Richard P. Rita Pers. Services Int'l, Inc. v. Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79 (Ga. 1972).
108. Id. at 81 (emphasis added) (quoting Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not
to Compete, 73 HIav. L. REV. 625, 682-83 (1960)).
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wise unenforceable agreements. The Rita Personnel Services Court
properly noted the negative consequences of the blue pencil doctrine.
The Court explained that "[i]f severance is generally applied, employ-
ers can fashion truly ominous covenants with confidence that they will
be pared down and enforced when the facts of a particular case are not
unreasonable."o 9 The Valley Medical Court echoed the same senti-
ment when it stated that "employers may therefore create ominous
covenants, knowing that if the words are challenged, courts will mod-
ify the agreement to make it enforceable."' 10
The noncompete agreement most harms those employees not
aware of the peculiar nature of the covenant. An agreement that
would never be enforced in a court may prevent an employee from
changing positions, from starting a new business, or from seeking
more compensation.
Some dispute the in terrorem effect of noncompete agreements. In
Raimonde v. Van Vlerah,111 the Ohio Supreme Court faced a situation
in which the defendant argued that the blue pencil doctrine would al-
low employers to dictate restraints "without fear, knowing that judges
will rewrite contracts if they are taken to court."1 12 The Court found
the contention meritless, explaining that "[miost employers who enter
contracts do so in good faith, and seek only to protect legitimate inter-
ests. In fact, relatively few employment contracts reach the
courts."11 3
B. The Blue Pencil Doctrine Creates Confusion
The blue pencil doctrine creates confusion for employees, employ-
ers, and the court system. The problem arises out of the fact that it is
impossible to predict the construction of a noncompete agreement
accurately.
1. The Doctrine Confuses Employees
The blue pencil doctrine confuses employees. Since the doctrine
builds uncertainty into every employment contract, an employee may
never be certain of his rights under the agreement. In a blue pencil
state, an employee wishing to leave his employer for a competitor will
not know the actual terms of his noncompete agreement. Even if the
agreement appears unreasonable and unenforceable, the blue pencil
doctrine creates uncertainty.
109. Id.
110. Valley Medical Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1286 (citing Blake, supra note 108, at
682-83).
111. 325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 1975).




This uncertainty carries with it costs to the employee. The em-
ployee who remains at his position, fearful that the blue pencil would
not help his case, suffers lost opportunity costs. The employee who
leaves his position may be forced to accept a reduced salary from a
new employer due to the perceived risk of litigation.
The court in Dearborn v. Everett J. Prescott, Inc. 114 accurately de-
scribed the employee's dilemma: "The restless or departing employee
could have no 'clear understanding of what conduct is prohibited.' He
could not secure meaningful legal advice because he could not know
what the employer might want to enforce. He could not ask the em-
ployer to decide without effectively burning bridges with the
employer."115
2. The Doctrine Confuses Employers
It is not just employees who suffer-the blue pencil doctrine also
causes confusion for employers. The blue pencil doctrine leaves an
employer guessing as to how broadly it can draft a restrictive covenant
before the court will refuse to blue pencil it. As discussed further be-
low, examples exist of courts in "blue pencil" states that were so of-
fended by an overreaching covenant that they refused to alter the
agreement.116 Several recent decisions found the court nullifying the
agreement completely rather than amending it, even where amend-
ment was possible."17
Other examples of potential harm suffered by employers through
the combined effect of noncompete agreements and the blue pencil
doctrine also exist. Although the point is often lost in the discussion of
noncompete agreements, for every employer that benefits from the
noncompete agreement, another suffers. Companies who want to hire
an applicant subject to a noncompete agreement must weigh the po-
tential benefits of the agreement against the burden of possibly hav-
ing to enforce the agreement. Often, the hiring employer must
perform its own legal analysis to discover whether the noncompete
agreement can or will be enforced. Unfortunately, because of the blue
pencil doctrine, even after performing such analysis, potential employ-
ers lack guidance as to the extent the noncompete agreement will be
enforced since courts over time have interpreted similar agreements
in different ways. Thus, employers may be deprived of access to well-
trained employees, even those subject to otherwise unenforceable
agreements.118
114. 486 F. Supp. 2d 802 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
115. Id. at 816.
116. See infra section V.A.
117. See id.
118. In DP Solutions, Inc v Rollins, Inc. 353 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2003), the defendant
hired two former employees of the plaintiff. Id. at 426. The plaintiff brought suit
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3. The Doctrine Confuses the Legal System
The blue pencil doctrine creates confusion for the legal system.
Among those states where noncompete agreements are enforced,
courts can look forward to an ever-growing stream of noncompete liti-
gation. Courts are already overburdened with the need to decide
questions of reasonableness and whether the restraint as set forth in
the agreement is actually necessary to protect the legitimate business
interests of the employer. The blue pencil doctrine does nothing to
alleviate this problem, as courts must take on the additional burden of
rewriting an agreement in the manner that the parties could have, but
did not, write it upon execution.
4. The Blue Pencil Doctrine Encourages Litigation
The above discussion makes it clear that the fact-specific nature of
the reasonableness test alone creates an incentive to litigate. As the
test is presently construed, it is difficult for anyone-employer, em-
ployee, or attorney-to predict the result of the threshold reasonable-
ness question. Even for those agreements that contain limits on
scope, duration, and geography, it is virtually impossible to predict
whether those limits will be held enforceable. While virtually every-
one would agree that a five-year ban would violate public policy, it
would be hard to guess whether a six-month to three-year prohibition
would be held enforceable. Similarly, while a worldwide geographic
restriction seems too large, one could make the case that for those do-
ing business on the Internet, the world may well be a proper geo-
graphic restriction.
The blue pencil doctrine exacerbates the problem by providing fur-
ther uncertainty. The blue pencil doctrine deprives the court and the
parties of the touchstone to contract construction: the actual, written
agreement between the parties. The blue pencil doctrine gives those
employees wealthy enough to access the court system license to test
the limits of the noncompete agreement. The blue pencil doctrine en-
courages litigation by building a degree of uncertainty into every em-
ployment agreement.
Further, noicompete agreement-related litigation may go beyond a
mere employer-employee dispute. A company that hires an employee
nominally bound by a noncompete agreement with a former employer
may face potential liability for, among other things, tortious interfer-
alleging tortious interference with contract. Id. The court awarded the plaintiff
$27,000 in damages, arising out of defendant's hiring of plaintiffs ex-employees.
Id. at 426, 430-31. The damages figure was based on testimony by the plaintiffs
attorneys as to the amount of fees expended in pursuit of the tortious interference
claim. Id. at 430-31.
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ence with contract. 1 19 The new employer must often make the diffi-
cult decision of whether to hire an applicant or risk a lawsuit, based
on a purposely vague agreement signed years before.
Finally, special attention must be paid to another recent trend.
The employer who demands its employees sign an unenforceable
noncompete agreement may open itself to liability for wrongful termi-
nation. An employer that terminates an employee for refusing to sign
a potentially unenforceable noncompete agreement may, as demon-
strated by recent decisions from New Jersey and California, face a
lawsuit of its own. 120
V. PUTTING THE BLUE PENCIL DOWN
A. Recent Trends Support the End of the Blue Pencil
Doctrine
Reformers eager to end the blue pencil doctrine may find support
in several recent decisions. Recently, several federal courts have ex-
hibited a reluctance to tolerate noncompete agreements with overly
onerous covenants.
One such case is Hay Group, Inc. v. Bassick.121 In that matter, the
court faced a noncompete agreement that purported to ban the em-
ployment of the defendant in any capacity with any competitor.12 2
The noncompete agreement also contained a severability clause,
which plaintiff believed would save the agreement from being found
completely unenforceable. 12 3
As noted previously, Illinois courts take a liberal approach to the
blue pencil doctrine, which provides the court with ample opportunity
to amend the agreement in place. In this case, however, the court
noted that "[w]hile a court applying Illinois law may 'make slight mod-
ifications to effectuate the intent of the parties... the degree of unrea-
sonableness of the original restraint' is a significant factor in guiding
119. Id. at 430-31.
120. See Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc'ns, Inc., 820 A.2d 105 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2003); Walia v. Aetna, Inc., 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
121. No. 02C8194, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22095 (E.D. Ill. September 29, 2005).
122. Id. at *10-*11.
123. The severability clause in Hay Group read as follows:
It is the desire and intent of the parties that the provisions of this Cove-
nant Not to Compete shall be enforced to the fullest extent permissible
under the laws and public policies applied in each jurisdiction in which
enforcement is sought. If any particular provisions or portion of this Cov-
enant Not to Compete shall be adjudicated to be invalid or unenforce-
able, this Covenant Not to Compete shall be deemed amended to delete
therefrom such provision or portion adjudicated to be invalid or unen-
forceable, such amendment to apply only with respect to the operation of
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the court's modification."124 The court noted that in those cases where
"the restraint is patently 'unfair because of its overbreadth,' courts
will refuse to modify the agreement, even in the presence of a sever-
ability clause."125
Under Illinois law, when a court determines whether to apply the
blue pencil and reform a covenant, it must first examine the fairness
of the initial restraint. 12 6 In Illinois "[a] court should refuse to modify
an unreasonable restrictive covenant 'where the degree of unreasona-
bleness renders it unfair."' 12 7 Under Illinois law, public policy dis-
courages dramatic revisions of restrictive covenants. 128 Moreover,
"courts generally try to stay away from rewriting agreements or
mak[ing] drastic modifications."129
Another Illinois federal court summed up this fairness test in Pac-
tiv Corp. v. Menasha Corp.130 In Pactiv, the court confronted the
question of whether to blue pencil an unreasonable noncompete provi-
sion. 13 1 The plaintiff argued that, even if the court refused to enforce
the overly broad noncompete agreement at issue, the court retained
sufficient power to modify the agreement to make it comply with the
law.' 3 2 The court acknowledged that Illinois law provided it with dis-
cretionary authority to blue pencil an unreasonable agreement.13 3
The court noted, however, that in determining whether or not to
amend an agreement, it would examine the "fairness of the restraint
initially imposed."134 The court could decline to exercise its power to
modify a noncompete agreement "where the degree of unreasonable-
ness renders it unfair."13 5
The Pactiv court recognized the danger created by a court's use of
the blue pencil doctrine. The Pactiv court noted that a court "should
consider, importantly, that the 'modification could have the potential
effect of discouraging the narrow and precise draftsmanship which
should be reflected in written agreements." ' 13 6 In other words, courts
124. Id. at *12-*13 (quoting Eichmann v. Nat'l Hosp. and Health Care Servs., Inc.,
719 N.E.2d 1141, 1149 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)).
125. Id. at *13 (quoting Eichmann, 719 N.E.2d at 1149).
126. Id.
127. Pactiv Corp. v. Menasha Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (quot-
ing Eichmann, 719 N.E.2d at 1149).
128. Id. at 1016.
129. Joy v. Hay Group, Inc., No. 02C4989, 2003 WL 22118930, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
11, 2003).
130. 261 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
131. Id. at 1015-16.








that routinely modify overly broad agreements encourage employers
to draft more such agreements. A court may only limit the potential
damage of unreasonable agreements by refusing to modify them.
When gifted with a court that will create a narrow agreement after
the fact, employers have little incentive to draft narrowly tailored
agreements on their own.137
The court discussed the factors that should be considered when de-
ciding whether to "blue pencil" an agreement if a court has to rewrite
the entire agreement to make in enforceable in Joy v. Hay.138 The
court explained that, "[i]f, in order to make the terms of the agreement
reasonable, a court would essentially have to draft a new agreement,
that court would probably decline to do so."139 The Joy court recog-
nized the policy reasons behind its decision not to reform the agree-
ment at issue and explained that "[tihe idea behind declining to
rewrite unreasonable and unfair agreements is that courts would like
to encourage employers to more narrowly draft their covenants."140
Similarly, in Indiana, in Dearborn v. Everett J. Prescott, Inc.,l 41
the court refused to reform an unreasonably broad agreement. 14 2 This
decision followed Product Action International, Inc. v. Mero143 in
which the court held that the practice of allowing a court to reform an
overbroad noncompetition clause, instead of striking it down, deprives
an employee and a prospective employer of guidance as to what is per-
missible.14 4 The court explained its decision as follows:
A prospective new employer ... could not read the... [clause] and know what
sorts of activity would be prohibited and what would not... A current em-
ployee may be frozen in his or her job by an unreasonably broad covenant.
Even if the employee believes the covenant is too broad, she may be able to
test that proposition only through expensive and risky litigation.
1 4 5
Further, a severability clause could not save the agreement. l4 6
The Product Action court refused to accept the plaintiffs demand that
it reform the contract in accordance with the severability clause. 147
The court said that to do so "would require the court to add terms that
137. Id.
138. No. 02C4989, 2003 WL 22118930, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2003).
139. Id. at *10.
140. Id.
141. 486 F. Supp. 2d 802 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
142. Id. at 821.
143. 277 F. Supp. 2d 919 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
144. Id. at 930-31.
145. Id.
146. The clause stated:
If the scope of any stated restriction is too broad to permit enforcement
of such restriction to its fullest extent, then such restriction shall be en-
forced to the maximum extent permitted by law and the court making
such determination shall have the power to modify this Agreement in
order for it to conform with the applicable law. Id. at 922.
147. See id. at 927-32.
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the parties never agreed to."148 The court provided a succinct argu-
ment for abolishing the blue pencil doctrine by noting that when an
employee seeks to avoid an overbroad covenant, courts should not be
asked to "do for the employer what it should have done in the first
place-write a reasonable covenant." 14 9
Finally, a Maryland court wrestled with the issue as to whether it
should blue pencil an overly restrictive noncompete agreement in
Deutsche Post Global Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad.150 There, the plaintiff
sued two former employees and attempted to enforce only a very nar-
row portion of the original restrictive covenant. 15 1 To make the re-
striction enforceable, the court noted that it only needed to strike out
certain provisions in the agreement.152 The court acknowledged that
these deletions would have been "in line with what Maryland courts
have traditionally done under the blue pencil rule."153 Nevertheless,
since the court was troubled by the language of the nonsolicitation
portion of agreement, it refused to blue pencil the agreement and
found the entire agreement unenforcecable. 15 4
B. A New Threshold Inquiry
As shown above, the blue pencil doctrine fails on a number of
levels. Even in those jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine, courts
can choose whether or not to apply it. A review of case law reveals
that the doctrine is employed inconsistently and irregularly. As such,
both courts and practitioners likly will find the doctrine of little use.
Thus, it is time to institute a new threshold test. Before engaging
in the standard reasonableness test, a court should determine if the
agreement meets a new standard of specificity. An enforceable agree-
ment would contain language that makes it specific to the employee to
be restrained, that identifies the business interest that the provision
will protect, and that describes the means by which the interest would
be protected.
148. Id. at 928.
149. Product Action Int'l, Inc. v. Mero, 277 F. Supp. 2d 919, 932 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
150. 292 F. Supp. 2d 748 (D. Md. 2003).
151. Id. at 754.
152. Id.
153. Id. The judge acknowledged his personal misgivings about the blue pencil
doctrine:
In my view to permit blue penciling encourages an employer to impose
an overly broad restrictive covenant, knowing that if the covenant is
challenged by an employee the only consequence suffered by the em-
ployer will be to have a court write a narrower restriction for it. This
appears to me to be extremely unfair and contrary to sound public policy.
Id. at 754 n.3.
154. Id. at 756, 758.
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The proposed new threshold test will benefit both employees and
employers. This proposed new threshold test will bring consistency
and clarity to the enforcement of noncompete agreements. It will en-
able drafters. to establish the actual enforceable parameters of a
noncompete agreement within the four corners of the document. Fur-
thermore, the specificity test will add an increased measure of predict-
ability to the question of whether a noncompete agreement will be
enforced. An employee will know, at the time they sign the document,
the employer's expectations as to the limits of the employee's future
employment with a competitor. Moreover, the employee will sign the
document knowing that it will likely be enforced and, therefore, will
know what to expect after signing it.
B. A Proposal for Specificity
1. The Provision Must be Made Specific to the Promissor
The first part of the proposed test requires that the provision be
made specifically for the employee in his current position. This should
prevent the automatic inclusion of boilerplate language, which invites
litigation and abuse. This "identity" test goes beyond merely naming
the restrained party. At the outset, the noncompete agreement should
identify the employment position or job area being restrained. Thus,
the identity requirement prevents the employer from using the
noncompete agreement years after its original execution in those cases
in which the employer and the employee are in circumstances far dif-
ferent than those in which the contract was executed.
The noncompete agreement should set forth, in detail, the reasons
why this particular employee will be restrained from competing after
the termination of his employment. The employer should consider fac-
tors such as the particular education or experience of the employee at
the time of hire, the specialized training that he might receive on the
job, and the specialized knowledge that he will receive while
employed.
There are recent cases that suggest that it would be beneficial for
courts to require "specificity." One example of the problem caused by
the failure to write a restrictive covenant pursuant to job position is
illustrated in Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. v. Carter.155 In this 2007
case, the court faced a noncompete agreement executed in 1978-al-
most thirty years prior to the termination of employment. 156 The
plaintiffs predecessor had originally hired the defendant for an entry-
level position. 15 7 At the time of suit, the restrictive covenant barred
the plaintiff from working in a competitive business anywhere in the
155. No. 06-15652, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9095 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2007).
156. Id. at *7.
157. Id. at *2.
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United States or Canada.158 The court had to construe an agreement
that was executed by a previous employer and that was meant to re-
strain a brand-new hire in a low-level position. From the agreement,
it was apparent that nobody had contemplated that the restrictive
covenant would someday be used against a senior-level manager with
decades of work history. Nevertheless, because of the lack of specific-
ity in the original agreement, the court found itself in the uncomforta-
ble position of conducting a standard of reasonableness analysis, in
the same way that it would have if the contract had been executed just
days before the suit.159
From the employee's perspective, this requirement would provide
numerous benefits. The proposed rule of specificity requires the em-
ployer to make the prima facie case that the noncompete agreement is
reasonable. The specificity requirement would also ensure that the
employee had adequate knowledge of the fact that he would be re-
strained from competing with his employer. Finally, by requiring
specificity, employers would be discouraged from automatically in-
cluding noncompete agreements in employment contracts. An em-
ployer would have to balance the benefit to be gained by the
noncompete agreement against the added burden of specifically
describing the reasons for the agreement. One can easily imagine that
employers would be less likely to use the agreement if the law re-
quired them to take the time to state the specific reasons for its use.
Another recent case illustrates the difficulty of dealing with agree-
ments drafted without regard to the parties or positions being re-
strained. In Dearborn v. Everett J. Prescott, Inc.,160 the court faced a
situation in which a company required all sales representatives and
managers nationwide to sign non-competition agreements. 16 1 All of
the agreements were identical in their form and scope and failed to
differentiate between employees with different duties. 16 2 Further, the
agreements failed to take into account where the employee lived and
all contained statements that Maine law would govern their construc-
tion. 163 Finally, all agreements provided for an identical token pay-
ment of $250 regardless of the employee's position. 16 4
158. Id. at *7-*8.
159. Id. at *29-*36. The case was further complicated by the legal gymnastics the
court was required to perform as a result of the choice of law provision contained
in the agreement. The agreement contained a provision choosing Ohio law.
Carter argued that Michigan law should apply. Although noncompete agree-
ments have been enforceable in Michigan since 1985, at the time the contract was
signed, the law declared them invalid. Id. at *14.
160. 486 F.Supp. 2d 802 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
161. Id. at 805-06.





The plaintiff, Dearborn, was an Indiana resident, and the defen-
dant employer, though based in Maine, maintained 32 offices in nine
different states.16 5 The plaintiff worked for the defendant for ten
years, spending all of that time at various offices in Indiana.166 Nev-
ertheless, despite the plaintiffs Indiana citizenship and despite the
plaintiffs decade of work in Indiana, the defendant argued that,
Maine law should apply.16 7
Application of Maine law would have doubtlessly benefited the de-
fendant employer, and, thus, it had little reason to restrict the agree-
ment. As noted above, under Maine law, the enforceability of a non-
competition covenant depends, not on the covenant as written, but in-
stead on the extent to which the employer seeks to enforce it.168 Indi-
ana law, however, limited-in the absence of genuine trade secrets,
geographic and customer restrictions on a departing salesman to en-
sure that such restrictions were not broader than the scope of the em-
ployee's former responsibilities. 16 9
Finally, a review of Teixon Corp. v. Hoffman170 reveals yet another
case where blanket noncompete agreements created an unenforceable
provision.1 7 1 The court was so offended by the lack of fairness inher-
ent to the agreement at issue that it refused to "blue pencil" the agree-
ment. 172 The court called out for a specificity standard by stating that
"[w]e also hope to encourage employers to write contracts more nar-
rowly tailored to serve their own individual needs and, if necessary, to
vary those documents to restrict only the activities of particular
employees."173
165. Id. at 805.
166. Dearborn v. J. Everett J. Prescott, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 802, 805 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
167. Id. at 807.
168. See Everett J. Prescott, Inc. v. Ross, 383 F. Supp. 2d 180, 190 (D. Me. 2005) (cit-
ing Brignull v. Albert, 666 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1995)) (enforcing identical agreement
to extent that EJP demanded it be enforced).
169. See, e.g., Standard Register Co. v. Cleaver, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096-97 (N.D.
Ind. 1998); Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235, 241 (Ind. 1955);
Vukovich v. Coleman, 789 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Norlund v. Faust,
675 N.E.2d 1142, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) ("The use of territorial boundaries is
only one method of limiting a covenant's scope, and when a covenant not to com-
pete contains a restraint which clearly defines a class of persons with whom con-
tact is prohibited, the need for a geographical restraint is decreased."); Medical
Specialists v. Sleweon, 652 N.E.2d 517, 523-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
170. 720 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ill. 1989).
171. Id. at 660, 671.
172. Id. at 665-66.
173. Id. at 666.
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2. The Provision Must be Made Specific as to the Interests Being
Protected
Post-litigation analysis of protectable interests is costly, inefficient,
and may well lead to the wrong result. Thus, the proposed analysis
requires that the noncompete agreement identify the business inter-
ests that the provision will protect. As discussed above, the states
that enforce noncompete agreements generally will do so only if the
provision can be said to protect a legitimate business interest. This
remains true in both statutory and common law enforcement schemes.
The litigation of noncompete agreements often concerns whether
the previous employer actually had a legitimate business interest at
stake when it attempted to restrain the employee from working in a
similar position at a competing business.1 74 Some have described the
protected interest to be "the most crucial element to enforceability." 175
Many courts find that a noncompete agreement cannot be used to pre-
vent competition per se; instead, the interest sought to be enforced by
use of the noncompete agreement must be proprietary. 176
The limits, whether in terms of geography or customers, must be
reasonably congruent with the employer's protectable interest. 17 7 The
general requirement for geographic or customer limits is tied to the
former employee's own activities and may not apply if a broader cove-
nant is necessary to protect the employer's genuine trade secrets.1 78
Too often, courts are required to review noncompete agreements
without knowing exactly which of the employer's many varied inter-
ests is being protected. In fact, employers are not discouraged from
drafting clauses broadly in the hope that a court will read the clause
as protecting one of the above-named interests. The proposed specific-
ity test will place the burden on employers to actually name the inter-
ests that the noncompete agreement protects.
Under the proposed specificity test, the business interest to be pro-
tected should generally fall within one of the three categories dis-
cussed previously. The business interest should consist of a trade
174. See Katherine R. Schoofs, Employer Beware: Missouri Puts the Brakes on Inter-
ests Protected by a Restrictive Covenant, 70 U. Mo. KAN. CiTY L. REV. 171 (2001).
175. Mark W. Freel & Matthew T. Oliverio, When Commercial Freedoms Collide:
Trade Secrets, Covenants Not To Compete and Free Enterprise, 47 R.I. B.J., May
1999, at 9, 11.
176. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1281 (Ariz. 1999).
177. Standard Register Co. v. Cleaver, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096 (N.D. Ind. 1998)
(recognizing employer's legitimate interests with current customers in similar
case under Indiana law involving printed business forms and other business spe-
cialty printing products); Smart Corp. v. Grider, 650 N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995) ("A covenant not to compete must be sufficiently specific in scope to coin-
cide with only the legitimate interests of the employer . . ").
178. See Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. 1955); accord.
Ackerman v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ind. 1995).
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secret or confidential information, customer relationships, and more
rarely, goodwill.179 State law differs, but virtually all states recognize
these as protectable interests.1 8 0
States such as Utah, New York and Maryland include the em-
ployee's unique services among legitimate business interests. 18 1 Ken-
tucky, Pennsylvania and Georgia hold that employee training falls
within the rubric of legitimate business interests,182 while New
Hampshire and Washington reject this theory and hold that an em-
ployer's interest in recouping the costs associated with "recruiting and
hiring employees" is not protectable through a non-compete clause. 183
Florida and Tennessee recognize this interest, but with a distinction,
179. In Texas and Massachusetts, as well as many other states, goodwill is a protected
employer interest. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) (Vernon 2002)
(including employer goodwill as protectable interest); IKON Office Solutions, Inc.
v. Belanger, 59 F. Supp. 2d 125, 128 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that goodwill of
employer is a protectable interest, if employee cultivated his relationship with
the client during his employment with the employer).
180. See, e.g., Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Tex. 1991)
([Tihe restraint created [in a noncompete agreement] must not be greater than
necessary to protect the . . . [employer's] legitimate interests such as business
goodwill, trade secrets, or other confidential or proprietary information."). See
also Easy Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz, 964 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998) Paramount Termite Control Co v. Rector, 380 S.E.2d 922, 925 (Va. 1989)
(finding that customer contacts of former employees and knowledge of Para-
mount's methods of operation warranted the need for non-competition agree-
ments); Ridley v. Krout, 180 P.2d 124, 129 (Wyo. 1947) (stating that special facts
that make a restrictive covenant reasonable include possession of trade secrets,
confidential information communicated by employer, and special influence with
customer obtained while employed).
181. See System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983) (holding that
the unique services of an employee are a protectable employer interest); Reed,
Roberts Assocs. Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) ("[Ilnjunctive
relief may be available where an employee's services are unique or extraordinary
and the covenant is reasonable ... ."); Becker v. Bailey, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (Md.
1973) ("[Rlestrictive covenants may be applied and enforced only against those
employees who provide unique services or to prevent the future misuse of trade
secrets, routes or lists of clients, or solicitation of customers.").
182. See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495,
501-02 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (protecting employer's interests in training and develop-
ment costs of employees); Wesley-Jessen, Inc. v. Armento, 519 F. Supp. 1352,
1358 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that employer has an interest in the training it
provides employees); Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 596 A.2d 188, 193-94 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (recognizing employer's interest in "specialized training and
skills" that it taught the employee).
183. See National Employment Serv. Corp. v. Olsten Staffing Serv., Inc., 761 A.2d 401,
405 (N.H. 2000) (rejecting employee training as protectable interest); Copier Spe-
cialists, Inc. v. Gillen, 887 P.2d 919, 920 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that, in
absence of other protectable interests, training of employee did not warrant en-
forcement of non-competition agreement).
[Vol. 86:672
PUTTING THE BLUE PENCIL DOWN
by mandating that an employer must show "extraordinary or special-
ized training" before a restrictive covenant can be enforced. 1
8 4
Among those states that recognize customer relationships as a pro-
tectable interest, however, differences arise as to what sort of relation-
ships may be protected. Some states require a more permanent
relationship between customer and business for such a relationship to
fall within the realm of protected interests. For instance, in Illinois, in
Office Mates 5, North Shore, Inc. v. Hazen,'8 5 the court indicated that
the relationship between employer and customer must be nearly per-
manent.1 8 6 In Alabama, however, a customer relationship need not
rise to the level of near-permanence.1 8 7 Instead, Alabama law re-
quires only a "close relationship."l8 8 Applying Ohio law, the court in
Chicago Title Insurance Corporation v. Magnuson'8 9 seemed to imply
only that such relationships should be "strong" and "important."19o
Missouri law seems to have an even lower threshold.19 1 In Missouri,
protectable interests arise when an employer has "a stock of custom-
ers who regularly deal with the employer."'192 In the absence of a de-
fined group of customers systematically dealing with the employer, no
protectable interest arises. 19 3
Case law supports the proposed requirement of specificity. In Uni-
versity of Florida Board of Trustees v. Sanal,194 the employer urged
the court to interpret "specific prospective" customers to include all
people residing within a given geographic area. 195 The court rejected
this construction, finding that "to qualify as a 'legitimate business in-
terest' pursuant .. . [to the relevant Florida statute], a 'relationship'
with a 'prospective patient' must be, in addition to 'substantial,' one
with a particular, identifiable, individual."19 6
184. See Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that "to a limited degree, extraordinary or specialized training" is a legit-
imate employer interest); Vantage Tech., LLC v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 644-45
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ("[E]mployer may have a protectable interest in the unique
knowledge and skill that an employee receives through special training by his
employer, at least when such training is present along with other factors tending
to show a protectable interest.").
185. 599 N.E.2d 1072, 1080-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
186. Id. at 1080-83.
187. Concrete Co. v. Lambert, 510 F. Supp. 2d 570, 583 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
188. Id. ("A protectable interest may exist when an employee is in a position to gain
confidential information, [to gain] access to secret lists, or to develop a close rela-
tionship with clients.").
189. 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007).
190. Id. at 993-94.
191. JTL Consulting, L.L.C. v. Shanahan, 190 S.W.3d 389, 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 837 So. 2d 512, 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
195. Id. at 515.
196. Id. at 516.
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The description of the protected interests in the agreement is
merely a threshold requirement. The mere naming of the protected
interests is not a guarantee of enforcement.
3. The Provision Must be Made Specific as to the Means of
Protection
The third question a court should ask, as part of its threshold test
for enforceability, is whether the contract identifies the means by
which the noncompete agreement protects the employer's legitimate
business interests. This clause should prove the easiest for drafters to
meet and for the court to review.
The proper clause should be written in accordance with the major-
ity position that noncompete agreements should be limited by scope,
by geography, and by duration. Compliance with this requirement
should require minimum effort. It will require the employer to make a
reasonable assessment of the value of this particular employee to the
particular business interest being protected.
In addition, compliance with this requirement will ease the burden
on courts to create scope, geographic, or duration terms that are not
present in the original agreement. As discussed extensively within,
virtually all courts review these three issues as part of the reasonable-
ness test. This requirement simply requires the provisions to be stated
clearly. 197
Another benefit is that, when properly drafted, the provision will
further notify the employee of all the clauses in his contract. When
the employee knows exactly what his contract will say, he will have
the chance to negotiate the provisions and to decide how much re-
straint he is willing to accept.
What would such a specificity provision look like? Obviously, the
provision will depend on the type of position being restrained. But
generally, as a threshold test, drafters should not bury the specificity
requirements in boilerplate language. The language of the specificity
provision should be clear, concise, and direct. As such, a model provi-
sion under the proposed specificity rule might resemble the following:
Recitals:
197. In a recent unpublished opinion out of the Fifth Circuit, the court confronted the
lack of a geographic restriction. In Security Alarm Financing Enterprises, Inc. v.
Green, No. 06-30332, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 4836 (5th Cir. Mar. 2, 2007), the
appellate court overturned the district court's finding that the lack of a geo-
graphic restriction rendered a noncompete agreement unenforceable. Id. at *11.
The decision was based on the peculiar facts of the case, but it certainly provides
some evidence of ambivalence about refusing to enforce a noncompete agreement
based on the lack of a geographic restriction. See id.
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Employee. The Employee subject to this provision is John Doe. His position
at the Company at the time of execution of this agreement is head of paper
sales for the area comprised of Green, Eggs, and Ham counties.
Purpose. Employee will have access to customer contact lists belonging to
Company. These customer contact lists have been prepared by the Company
over a number of years and the Company has an interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of the customer contact information. Employee will also have
access to confidential pricing information belonging to the Company. This
pricing information is not publicly available. The Company desires to protect
the data found within these customer contact lists and pricing information
from its competitors.
Means. To ensure protection of the Company's customer contact lists and
pricing information, this agreement prohibits Employee from competing with
the Company. The parties agree that, for a period of six months following the
termination of employment, Employee will refrain from engaging in services
similar to those he provided for the Company, for himself, or for any competi-
tor of Company.
VI. CONCLUSION: A REVIEW OF BENEFITS GAINED
In short, we have weighed the "blue-pencil" doctrine in the balance, and found
it wanting. 1 9 8
Although it introduces yet another layer of analysis, the specificity
test will benefit employers, employees, and the public in the long run.
It will provide a framework that narrows the issues presented in a
dispute and encourages resolution at an early stage.
A. The Noncompete Agreement Needs Reform
The noncompete agreement has attracted a great deal of attention
in the last few years. Academics and practitioners alike have ex-
amined the subject. The reason for such interest is obvious: many can
see an upcoming disaster. The noncompete agreement, which was
born centuries ago against a very different social backdrop, fails to
comport with modern notions of employment. Employees today are
highly mobile: across employers, across careers, and across the world.
Despite these changes in the employment landscape, the law sur-
rounding the construction of noncompete agreements has remained
fundamentally unaltered for centuries. Although its weaknesses have
been apparent for some time, surprisingly few courts have attempted
to reform the analytical frameworks through which noncompetes are
examined. Instead, repeated attempts to salvage the covenant have
only managed to produce a morass of laws, doctrines, and analyses.
The noncompete agreement presents a special challenge for the
court system and places an unfair burden on trial courts. Judges
must simultaneously balance the needs of the public, the employer,
and the employee. In states where no statutory framework exists,
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courts must fill the role of a legislative body by framing and stating
public policy. Courts must also balance the protection of individuals
with the need to foster business development.
The disparity among the states in the treatment of noncompete
agreements also places a heavy burden on attorneys. In drafting a
non-compete agreement, attorneys must be aware of the judicial ap-
proach used in the jurisdiction whose law is to govern the agreement.
Depending on the state, courts may choose to: 1) refuse to enforce any
noncompete agreement; 2) enforce a reasonable agreement but nullify
any agreement that fails the reasonableness test; 3) strike any offend-
ing clause leaving the rest of the agreement in place; or 4) rewrite the
provision to make it enforceable.
B. The Specificity Test Will Free Employees and Employers
From Uncertainty and Lack of Clarity
The proposal contained in this Article may place an extra burden
on employers initially, but ultimately, the specificity test will benefit
both employees and employers. It will provide clarity to both parties
and ease uncertainty.
The specificity test benefits employees primarily by giving them
notice. Although it is difficult to establish through independent tests,
informal surveys reveal that great numbers of employees execute
noncompete agreements in the belief that the employer would never
attempt to enforce them. In fact, the noncompete agreement stands
alone among contractual provisions in that it is actually to the em-
ployee's benefit to negotiate an agreement that is broadly favorable to
the employer. The employee can be confident that, in the majority of
jurisdictions, an overly broad noncompete agreement cannot be
enforced.
Application of the specificity test places an additional responsibil-
ity on employers. However, that burden is diminished in large part by
the benefits that will accrue. Most importantly, employers will benefit
from increased predictability. Right now, unless the employer is in a
state that has banned all noncompete agreements, little certainty ex-
ists as to whether a noncompete agreement will be enforced or not.
Currently, employers have incentives to draft agreements as broadly
as possible. At the same time, however, they must attempt to guess
how broad is too broad. Enforcement depends upon the vagaries of
which court will ultimately decide the question of enforceability.
The specificity test will ensure a greater number of noncompete
agreements are enforced. Therefore, employees will be encouraged to
actively review, discuss, and negotiate their noncompete agreements
before execution. Furthermore, greater specificity and certainty will
ensure that the in terrorem effect of the overly broad noncompete
agreement will fade. Finally, the specificity test will provide much
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needed relief to the court system. The specificity test will decrease
litigation, decrease the use of the form noncompete agreement, and
encourage employers and employees to negotiate and abide by agree-
ments without the input of the court system.
